Benefits and drawbacks of European Unemployment Insurance.  Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/06, September 2014 by Claeys, Grégory et al.
BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS
OF EUROPEAN
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
bruegelpolicybrief
ISSUE 2014/06
SEPTEMBER 2014
by Grégory Claeys 
Research Fellow at Bruegel
gregory.claeys@bruegel.org
Zsolt Darvas 
Senior Fellow at Bruegel
zsolt.darvas@bruegel.org
and Guntram B. Wolff 
Director of Bruegel
guntram.wolff@bruegel.org
POLICY CHALLENGE
European Unemployment Insurance is one option for stabilising country-
specific economic cycles thanks to risk sharing, but it would not
substantively influence the area-wide fiscal stance. Moral hazard prob-
lems are significant but can be reduced by a less generous design and
more harmonisation of labour markets. The former would, however, reduce
the scheme’s stabilisation effect. Reform and harmonisation of labour
markets would improve the functioning of monetary union, but would
undermine long-standing prefer-
ences and ideals which the
subsidiarity principle guaran-
tees. The complexity of the
design and implementation of
EUI and the question of the right
legal base suggests that it would
be a long-term project and not a
measure to help quickly the mil-
lions currently unemployed.
Total labour market policies expenditure 2010*
THE ISSUE Unemployment in Europe has increased to high levels and eco-
nomic growth has remained subdued. A debate on additional policy
instruments to address the situation is therefore warranted. Fiscal stabilisa-
tion mechanisms have not provided adequate fiscal stabilisation during the
crisis in some countries nor in the euro area as a whole. Different prefer-
ences and historical developments mean that national labour markets are
differently organised, which sometimes hinders the efficient working of the
monetary union. European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) has been pro-
posed as a measure to contribute to fiscal policy management and improve
labour markets. 
Source: Bruegel. * in % of GDP. See Figure 2.
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BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
1. Expenditure in Roma-
nia amounted to only
0.2 percent of GDP,
while in Spain, with the
highest rate, expendi-
ture was 3.1 percent of
GDP in 2010. An unem-
ployed person in
Romania receives
€108/month (2012); in
Denmark it is €1909
(Source: DG Employ-
ment, European
Commission).
2. Dolls, Mathias,
Clemens Fuest and
Andreas Peichl (2010)
‘Automatic Stabilizers
and Economic Crisis: US
vs. Europe’, Working
paper 16275, NBER.
3. Sapir, André and Gun-
tram B. Wolff (2013)
‘The neglected side of
banking union: reshap-
ing Europe’s financial
system’, Bruegel contri-
bution to informal
Ecofin, September.
4. Krugman, Paul
(2013) ‘Revenge of the
Optimum Currency
Area’, in Daron Ace-
moglu, Jonathan
Parker, and Michael
Woodford (eds) NBER
Macroeconomics
Annual 2012, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
SHOULD THE EUROPEAN UNION
create a European Unemploy-
ment Insurance (EUI) scheme, in
the context of the significant
increase in unemployment in
Europe from 7 percent in 2009 to
10.8 percent in 2013? The idea
would be to move parts or all of
national unemployment insurance
to the European level to create a
new European mechanism to
better stabilise the economy and
thereby to reduce unemployment.
EUI would also be a mechanism to
improve the functioning of Euro-
pean labour markets.
On average, EU countries spent
0.9 percent of GDP on unemploy-
ment benefits in 2007. During the
crisis, this increased to 1.3 per-
cent in 2009 and then fell back to
1.1 percent in 2011. There are sig-
nificant differences between
countries, which result from dif-
ferent unemployment rates and
reflect substantial differences in
the generosity of schemes, as
well as different economic situa-
tions1. Generally, automatic
stabilisers in eastern and south-
ern European countries are much
weaker than in central and north-
ern European countries2.
Unemployment insurance is not
only important from a macroeco-
nomic point of view. It is a central
element of social policy. The cre-
ation and design of national
schemes was intrinsically linked
to industrial, economic, social and
political developments in differ-
ent countries. In many countries,
social partners play an important
role in the management and
design of unemployment insur-
ance schemes. Unemployment
insurance in different countries
therefore comes with different
replacement rates, durations and
benefits (Table 1).
Behind the EUI debate is the reali-
sation that other stabilisation
mechanisms that typically exist
in monetary unions, such as
financial market risk sharing,
have not played their roles fully3.
Also, worker mobility in the euro
area has been less than optimal
from a currency-union perspec-
tive4. There is also a realisation
that differently functioning labour
markets are particularly difficult in
a monetary union because of dif-
ferent wage-setting mechanisms.
It has been argued that an EUI
scheme would be a way to
achieve greater solidarity among
Europeans. While the European
treaties foresee solidarity as an
important element of European
integration (Preamble and Articles
2 and 3 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the EU), they also aim to
prevent fiscal transfers between
the countries of the monetary
union (Article 125 of the TFEU).
We assess the main arguments
for and against EUI. In favour are
the possible contribution of EUI to
macroeconomic stabilisation and
the contribution it can make to
achieve greater convergence of
labour market institutions. Argu-
ments against EUI include the
moral hazard that could arise from
the creation of a common insur-
ance system, the technical
complexity and the fact that
labour market heterogeneity
reflects country preferences. We
then highlight ten choices that EU
policymakers need to make if
they wish to move ahead with an
EUI scheme.  
EUI PROPOSALS
EUI would either replace or sup-
plement national unemployment
insurance. EUI could either be
administered centrally or at the
Table 1: Heterogeneity of national
unemployment benefit systems
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Austria 12 55 49
Belgium* 48 65 58
Bulgaria 12 60 23
Croatia 15 70 23
Cyprus 6 50 25
Czech Rep. 5 65 36
Denmark 48 60 49
Estonia 12 50 41
Finland* 16 45 56
France 36 75 49
Germany 24 60 82
Greece** 12 29
Hungary 3 60 31
Ireland** 8
Italy 14 75 16
Latvia 9 65 29
Lithuania** 9 29
Luxembourg 12 80 36
Malta** 6
Netherlands 38 75
Poland** 12 17
Portugal 12 65 41
Romania** 12 18
Slovakia 6 50 19
Slovenia 25 80 28
Spain 24 70 41
Sweden 14 80 25
UK** 6 33
Source: The EU's Mutual Information System
on Social Protection (MISSOC) comparative
tables for duration and replacement rate;
Bruegel calculation using Eurostat's Labour
Force Survey for the coverage ratio. Note: *
provide an indefinite unemployment stipend
after other benefits have been exhausted; **
provide flat rates of insurance coverage
(Greece: €360/month, Ireland: €188/week,
Malta: €12.35/day, Portugal: €190/month,
Romania: €130/week). Replacement rate:
unemployment benefit as a percent of previ-
ous wage. Coverage ratio: the number of short
term unemployed receiving benefits to total
number of short-term unemployed (%).
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5. Andor, László (2014)
‘Basic European unem-
ployment insurance as
an automatic fiscal sta-
biliser for an EMU 2.0’,
Speech/14/485, con-
ference on ‘Economic
shock absorbers for the
euro zone’, Brussels, 20
June.
6. See Dullien, Sebast-
ian (2013) ‘A euro-area
wide unemployment
insurance as an auto-
matic stabilizer: Who
benefits and who
pays?’, Paper prepared
for the European Com-
mission (DG EMPL);
Lellouch, Thomas and
Arthur Sode (2014) ‘An
Unemployment Insur-
ance Scheme for the
Euro Area’, Trésor-Eco-
nomics 132, Direction
Générale du Trésor;
Claeys, Gregory, Simon
Ganem, Pia Hüttl and
Thomas Walsh (2014)
‘Do it yourself: Euro-
pean unemployment
insurance’, Bruegel
blog, forthcoming.
7. Insurance for large
shocks based on budg-
etary transfers linked to
the output gap is pro-
posed by Wolff,
Guntram B. (2012) ‘A
budget for Europe’s
Monetary Union’, Policy
Contribution 22/2012,
Bruegel. A ‘contingent’
unemployment benefit
scheme, which would be
triggered only in case of
a reason why the EU should
create an EUI scheme. The
founders of Europe’s monetary
union allocated the role of fiscal
stabilisation to national budgets
without any European counter-
part. With prudent fiscal policy in
good times, it would be possible
to let automatic stabilisers oper-
ate freely and to implement
discretionary stimulus in crisis
times, thereby dampening the
impact of a recession. This strat-
egy broadly worked in most EU
countries during the recent crisis,
but there were two problems,
which will likely reappear in future
downturns:
• Inadequate stabilisation at
EU/euro-area level and the lack
of a European instrument to
influence the European fiscal
stance. Member states
implement the policy deemed
appropriate for their own
economies, subject to the
constraints of the European
fiscal governance framework.
During 2011-13, the sum of
national fiscal policies led to a
European fiscal stance that
was not optimal given the
downturn in the business
cycle. Figure 1 shows that,
following the 2008-09
stimulus, fiscal consolidation
followed in parallel with the
narrowing of the output gap.
However, after 2010 the
output gap widened again in
Europe while fiscal policy
continued to consolidate.
Therefore, the aggregate fiscal
stance did not address the
widening output gap and fiscal
policy became pro-cyclical8.
• Several countries ran out of
fiscal space and were forced to
implement pro-cyclical fiscal
tightening in a deep economic
crisis. This was especially criti-
cal in euro-area countries
where changes to a country-
specific exchange rate cannot
help the adjustment. Though
one can argue that the lack of
fiscal space in some euro-area
countries during the recent
crisis was the consequence of
inadequate pre-crisis policies,
it was difficult to identify vul-
national level. If administered at
national level, the scheme would
foresee payments between
national administrations. Ideally,
financial flows would go from
countries with low unemploy-
ment to countries with high and
increasing unemployment.
One often-proposed scheme (the
‘all-time’ variant) would cover a
large percentage of the previous
income of a person losing a job for
the first 12 months of unemploy-
ment5, replacing fully or partly the
current national systems. The rev-
enues would come – as in the
national case – from contribu-
tions paid by employers and
employees. Countries could sup-
plement the EUI scheme if they
wish to increase payments to the
jobless above the EUI payouts.
The EUI scheme might be allowed
to borrow on markets to deal with
a recession affecting all coun-
tries. Simple mechanical
simulations suggest that such a
scheme would lead to flows
towards countries in heavy reces-
sion of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent
of their GDP6. The flows typically
end after three years if country-
specific contribution rates are
adjusted upwards to prevent per-
manent transfers.
Another variant of the scheme
(the ‘catastrophic’ variant) would
provide support to countries in
case of a negative shock large
enough to have a major negative
impact on public finances7.
EUI AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
FISCAL STABILISATION POLICY?
Insufficient macroeconomic sta-
bilisation in the EU and the euro
area in particular is often given as
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Source: European Commission May 2014 forecast. Note: The primary budget balance does
not include interest payments. The structural primary budget balance measures the
underlying position of the primary budget balance by eliminating the impact of the
economic cycle and one-time expenditure and revenue items. The output gap measures
the difference between actual and potential GDP.
Figure 1: Output gap and general government primary budget
balance in the euro area (% of GDP), 2000-14
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nerabilities when policies were
adopted and the European sur-
veillance framework also failed
to foresee that a crisis might
come and lead to fiscal con-
straints. Even countries that
had low pre-crisis public debt
levels and budgetary sur-
pluses, such as Spain and
Ireland, faced major fiscal con-
straints during the crisis.
It is unlikely that these two prob-
lems will be sufficiently resolved
by the reformed EU economic and
fiscal governance framework.
While the EU's two-pack regula-
tions9 will enable the European
Commission to assess the ex-
ante change in the aggregate
fiscal stance of the EU and to
advise countries to change their
stances, the Commission has no
direct control over deficits. Both
European and national fiscal rules
exclusively consider fiscal targets
at the national level, disregarding
the area-wide fiscal stance. The
scope to use national fiscal poli-
cies in a number of euro-area
countries is also hampered by the
already high debt levels and the
potential negative market reac-
tions. Therefore, the sum of
national fiscal stances will likely
deviate from what would be opti-
mal for the whole area.
Fiscal policy constraints during a
crisis might also re-emerge. True,
the Macroeconomic Imbalances
Procedure should help to identify
private-sector vulnerabilities
leading to fiscal constraints. The
banking union and the new bail-in
rules (Bank Resolution and
Recovery Directive – BRRD)
should help to limit future bank
rescue costs for governments.
The European Central Bank’s Out-
right Monetary Transactions
(OMT) programme or other possi-
ble arrangement should help to
contain interest rate increases.
However, it would be naïve to
believe that there will be no future
economic and financial crises and
that if there is one, no government
would face a fiscal constraint.
Overall, the euro area needs to
contemplate additional fiscal
instruments that could help sta-
bilisation during area-wide crises.
Moreover, it could be desirable to
have an additional instrument to
ensure that countries running out
of fiscal space do not have to cut
automatic stabilisers in a pro-
cyclical manner. Whether or not
EUI would be the right and easy
option10 is a big question.
In normal times, EUI would not
influence the aggregate fiscal
stance, because it would just
replace national automatic sta-
bilisers with a European
automatic stabiliser. The scheme
would provide more fiscal
resources to countries heavily
affected by an increase of unem-
ployment. However, countries
would have freedom to decide
what to do with the additional
resources and the fundamental
problem of fiscal policy coordina-
tion would therefore remain, even
if the EUI scheme can borrow on
the markets.
On the other hand, EUI would con-
tribute to the aggregate fiscal
stance if several countries were
becoming fiscally constrained
and were to use the additional
resources for spending. EUI could
thereby allow them to limit pro-
cyclical cuts in spending or even
to use discretionary fiscal policy
for other purposes. But they could
also run smaller fiscal deficits in
which case the area-wide stabili-
sation effect would be small or
non-existent. A benefit in this
case might arise from the reduced
public debt level and the conse-
quent positive confidence effect.
The effectiveness of EUI schemes
in stabilising income very much
depends on the design, but typi-
cally, simulations show that the
effects are not very large11.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOUR
MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
SYSTEM DESIGN
National labour market institu-
tions in the EU are characterised
by great heterogeneity, making it
difficult to design an EUI scheme
and raising the possibility of sig-
nificant trade-offs. An eventual
EUI scheme would have major
implications for national labour
market institutions.
Employment protection legisla-
tion varies significantly in
different EU countries: in some
countries, such as Ireland, the UK
or central and eastern European
countries, flexibility prevails; in
other countries, such as France,
Germany and Italy, employment
protection is more prevalent.
Unemployment policies also
differ with distinctive ways of
organising public employment
services and training schemes for
the unemployed. Unemployment
benefit schemes also vary greatly
in terms of duration of benefits
(from three months in Hungary to
no limit in Belgium), replacement
rates and coverage ratios (see
Table 1 for definitions). Eligibility
major negative shocks is
proposed by Epaulard,
Anne (2014) ‘Contingent
vs. Non-Contingent
Unemployment Benefit
Scheme for the EMU’,
presentation to confer-
ence on Economic shock
absorbers for the Euro-
zone, Brussels, 20 June.
8. Several factors might
have contributed to the
widening of the output
gap after 2010, such as
euro break-up fears,
confidence effects, the
difficulties in the bank-
ing system and
insufficiently expansive
monetary policy.
9. To strengthen the
surveillance mecha-
nisms in the euro area;
see http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/arti-
cles/governance/2012-0
3-14_six_pack_en.htm.
10. Details on other
options available to
create a fiscal stabilisa-
tion tool can be found
in Wolff (2012; see
note 7) and Pisani-
Ferry, Jean, Erkki
Vihriälä and Guntram B.
Wolff (2013) ‘Options
for a euro-area fiscal
capacity’, Policy Contri-
bution 2013/01,
Bruegel.
11 Micro simulations,
focusing on the effec-
tiveness of a basic
European scheme to
act as an insurance
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BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
thereby an insignificant contribu-
tion to stabilisation. If instead it
was based on an EU or euro-area
average, countries with less gen-
erous national unemployment
insurance systems will have to
accept a more ambitious system
with larger contributions than
their citizens in employment cur-
rently pay.  
Another major difference between
countries is the degree of involve-
ment of social partners. In some
countries, unions and employer
associations play a central role in
the definition of unemployment
benefits; in other countries, such
decisions are shared with or even
taken by the government alone
(see Table 2 on the next page).
Significant differences between
countries also exist in terms of
corporate governance, which
might impact frictional unemploy-
ment (and therefore short-term
unemployment) and on wage
levels. Figure 3 shows that short-
term unemployment in proportion
to total unemployment was sub-
stantially different in different
countries even before the crisis.
For instance, France and Ger-
many had similar unemployment
rates in 2007, but the share of
short-term unemployment was
greater in France, probably
reflecting the different function-
ing of labour markets. Other
differences in unemployment
result from policies, for instance,
a large part of the 2008‐09 shock
was mitigated in Germany by
labour market institutions such
as short‐time work or working-
time accounts. Such differences
make it harder to design an EUI
scheme, and could require differ-
ent contribution rates in different
participating member states,
depending on the functioning of
their labour markets. Further-
more, EUI could affect short-term
unemployment patterns because
of changed incentives, as argued
by Dolls et al (2014; see note 11).
Differences in labour markets and
the generosity of unemployment
benefits are no accident but are
the result of heterogeneous pref-
erences in different countries,
and reflect historical divergences
criteria12 and financing of unem-
ployment benefits also differ
significantly (totally financed by
contributions or partly subsidised
by the national government).
Such differences were reflected in
related public expenditure during
the crisis (Figure 2). In badly-hit
Spain and Ireland, public expendi-
ture related to labour market
policies (LMP) increased to about
4 percent of GDP, well above the
EU average, suggesting that in
these countries the unemploy-
ment insurance system was
effective in automatically stabilis-
ing the economic downturn. But in
the EU's hardest-hit countries,
Greece and Latvia, such expendi-
ture amounted to about or just
slightly more than 1 percent of
GDP, suggesting that automatic
stabilisation through unemploy-
ment insurance hardly worked13.
Therefore, an important trade-off
emerges. If the EUI scheme were
designed to match the least gen-
erous among the current national
systems, then it would provide
very limited payments and
device are run by Dolls,
Mathias, Clemens
Fuest, Dirk Neumann,
and Andreas Peichl
(2014) ‘An unemploy-
ment insurance
scheme for the euro
area: evidence at the
micro level’, forthcom-
ing working paper. They
find that with a rela-
tively small annual
budget, net benefits
would have stabilised
incomes in several
countries, but overall,
its growth-enhancing
effects would be mod-
erate.
12. Details on eligibility
criteria can be found in
Venn, Danielle (2012)
‘Eligibility Criteria for
Unemployment Bene-
fits: Quantitative
Indicators for OECD and
EU Countries’, OECD
Social, Employment
and Migration Working
Papers no. 131, OECD
Publishing.
13. See the specific
characteristics of the
Greek unemployment
insurance system in
Malkoutzis, Nick
(2014) ‘The Greek crisis
we don’t see’, Marco-
poslis, available at
http://www.macropo-
lis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-a
gora.1026.
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Source Figure 2: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: About two thirds or three quarters of LMP expenditures relate to unemployment benefits
(‘Out-of-work income maintenance and support’). Other LMP expenditures are composed of: labour market services, training, employment
incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, start-up incentives, early retirement. The first two categories
have a share of about 0.2 percent of GDP each in the EU28, the share of the third is slightly more than 0.1 percent of GDP, while the shares
of the remaining four categories are below 0.1 percent of GDP each in EU28. Source Figure 3: Bruegel based on OECD Employment data.
Figure 2: Labour market policies (LMP),
expenditure  as percent of GDP
Figure 3: Unemployment by duration in selected
countries, 2007 and 2013
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in social policies and significantly
different views about how labour
markets should be organised.
Alongside the implications for
national labour market institu-
tions, there would be a trade-off
between the design features of
EUI to limit moral hazard and the
effectiveness of the system to
provide stabilisation. EUI would
be most effective as a stabilisa-
tion tool if eligibility criteria are
loose, benefits are fully funded
from the European level, duration
of benefits extends beyond 12
months and there is no adjust-
ment of national contribution
rates following substantial
increases in unemployment.
However, such a system would
create moral hazard issues at the
level of individuals and national
policymakers. Rapid convergence
of all labour market policies would
therefore be desirable. Propo-
nents of EUI propose to limit the
risk of moral hazard by limiting
benefits and the duration of pay-
outs, and by adjusting national
contribution rates to avoid perma-
nent transfers. Such measures
would reduce the stabilisation
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effects of the system.
Arguably, differences between
national labour market institu-
tions and national wage-setting
mechanisms in particular are two
of the most important reasons for
the substantial divergences in
unit labour costs and wages in the
euro area. For example, nominal
compensation per employee
increased by 37 percent in Italy
and by 17 percent in Germany
between 1999 and 2011 even
though the difference cannot be
explained by productivity devel-
opments. These differentials in
wage developments are not only
a significant cause of concern for
the employees in the different
countries but they also make the
conduct of monetary policy more
difficult. The introduction of EUI
could be a major opportunity to
harmonise labour market institu-
tions, which might limit differences
in wage developments.
Overall, EUI could promote labour
market harmonisation with con-
vergence on the best practice
models in Europe. Such conver-
gence would also improve the
single market, foster labour
mobility and make the conduct of
monetary policy easier, but at the
cost of undermining long-stand-
ing preferences and ideals, which
the current subsidiarity of labour
market institutions guarantees. 
EUI: THE 10 KEY QUESTIONS
Policymakers will have to find
answers to a number of questions
if they wish to implement an EUI
scheme. We wish to highlight
upfront that this project cannot be
embarked on without a prior agree-
ment on fiscal risk-sharing. The
following questions are central:
1 Is this a scheme to support
those in need now or is it for
the future? Agreeing even on a
lowest common denominator
could take a long time, and leg-
islation and implementation
would delay the introduction of
such a system further. There-
fore, such a scheme could be
designed for the future. In the
meantime, in order to help the
currently unemployed, other
options could be considered
such as the implementation of
Table 2: Social partners’ involvement in unemployment benefit regimes in Europe
Type of involvement Self-perceived influence Countries
Institutionalised involvement and participation
in stable tripartite (State, Employers, Employ-
ees) bodies (intervening in policy
design/reform)
High
Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia
Low
Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Poland,
Romania, Spain
Institutionalised involvement and participation
in bipartite (Employers, Employees) bodies
High Belgium, France
Systematic involvement in ad hoc tri/bi-partite
committees
High Finland
Not institutionalised involvement in informa-
tion/ consultation practices
High Italy, Norway
Low Sweden, United Kingdom
Participation without involvement Low Ireland, Malta
Source: Bruegel based on European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Note: Institutionalised involve-
ment of social partners refers to the existence of stable institutions.
a substantial pan-European
investment plan.
2 Should the scheme be for the
EU or euro area only? While
stabilisation, solidarity and
labour market harmonisation
issues apply to all EU coun-
tries, monetary union has
specific stabilisation require-
ments given that its members
can be affected by asymmetric
shocks. One possibility would
be to implement it at euro-area
level and to give other EU coun-
tries the option to join,
similarly to the banking union.
3 Should labour-market institu-
tions be harmonised and
should the social dialogue be
elevated to European level?
As the eligibility criteria for the
EUI scheme would have to be
decided at the European level,
it would be preferable that
social partners play a role in
their definition. Without har-
monisation of labour market
institutions, structural differ-
ences in labour market
institutions should result in dif-
ferent contribution rates (ie
contribution rates should be
higher in countries with less
efficient labour markets)
which would undermine the
stabilisation properties of the
scheme. Harmonisation would
instead require agreement on
desirable standards. One
option would be to start the EUI
with country-specific contribu-
tion rates which would be
adjusted frequently (eg
yearly) to eliminate long-last-
ing transfers between
countries participating in the
EUI. As participating countries
progress with labour market
harmonisation, contribution
rates could be harmonised too.
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4 Potential permanent trans-
fers? If there is no willingness
to accept permanent transfers,
then contribution rates would
need to be different for differ-
ent countries so that countries
balance their net payments to
the EUI fund across the cycle.
This would however make the
scheme more complex and
less countercyclical if country-
specific contribution rates
have to be revised from time to
time.
5 Would a common scheme
require common administra-
tion? Without a common
administration, implementa-
tion is likely to vary in different
countries, creating potential
moral hazard problems. In
addition, efficiency gains from
a reformed administration
could be high and labour-
market matching across
Europe could be facilitated.
However, this would constitute
an extremely ambitious reform.
6 What kind of democratic over-
sight? Labour-market legislation
is at the heart of the democratic
process and is of high relevance
to citizens. The subsidiarity prin-
ciple calls for such legislation to
happen at the national level. The
introduction of EUI could put
numerous constraints on
national democratic processes
and would require agreement on
appropriate European demo-
cratic foundations to legitimise
the constraints.
7 Borrowing facility or not? To
play a stabilisation role in case
of an area-wide shock, a bor-
rowing facility would be
needed (additionally, national
discretionary fiscal policies
should also be coordinated). In
a system without a borrowing
facility, transfers from a coun-
try in a mild recession to a
country in a severe recession
might be needed and countries
facing fiscal constraints would
find it difficult to subsidise the
fund.
8 All-time or catastrophic insur-
ance? An all-time insurance
scheme would redistribute even
when there are small fluctua-
tions in the economy, though
the national unemployment
systems were and will be able to
handle small economic fluctua-
tions. Catastrophic insurance,
which would redistribute only in
the event of large shocks, could
be therefore preferable.
9 What should be the main
parameters? National sys-
tems vary greatly in terms of
duration of benefits, replace-
ment rates and eligibility. If the
EUI scheme were designed to
match the least generous
among the current systems in
member states, then it would
contribute little to stabilisation.
If instead it was based on an
EU or euro-area average, coun-
tries with less generous
national unemployment insur-
ance systems will have to
accept a more ambitious
system with larger contribu-
tions than their companies and
employed citizens currently
pay. This also applies to those
countries that are not yet euro-
area members but have an
obligation to join. There is thus
a trade-off between stabilisa-
tion properties and respect for
national preferences.
10 What legal framework? Even
though the EU Treaty sets an
objective to deepen solidarity
between European people and
countries, it does not provide a
14. To achieve this in a
gradual way, one option
would be to offer Euro-
pean labour contracts
as an alternative to
national labour con-
tracts and link EUI only
to the European labour
contracts and not the
national ones. See for
example Delpla,
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legal framework for an EUI
scheme. Therefore, either a
Treaty change would be
needed (which could be diffi-
cult to obtain), or an
intergovernmental agreement
would be required, which would
establish a major institution
outside the community frame-
work and would raise questions
about parliamentary control.
CONCLUSIONS
We have assessed various argu-
ments for and against a European
unemployment insurance
system and the central policy
choices that would have to be
made. In the euro area and in the
EU as a whole, fiscal policy was
pro-cyclical during 2011-13 and
some countries had to tighten
fiscal policy because they
reached the fiscal limits. Fiscal
policy coordination has been
inadequate and it is unlikely the
sum of national fiscal policy
stances will ever correspond to
the optimal aggregate fiscal
stance. In principle, a debate
about additional European stabili-
sation instruments is warranted
to complete Europe’s monetary
union.
An EUI system would direct finan-
cial flows to the unemployed and
would temporarily support the
economies of countries affected
by major increases in unemploy-
ment.  However, because it would
replace a national automatic sta-
biliser with a European automatic
stabiliser, EUI would not solve the
damentally different preferences
and economic models in the EU.
EUI could also be important to
bring a social dimension to the
European project, which is often
seen by citizens as oriented only
towards technical matters. EUI
could be seen as a way to create a
direct solidarity link between
European citizens.
Overall, we conclude that prior to
embarking on this project,
political consensus would be
needed on fiscal risk sharing and
further harmonisation and
integration of labour markets and
their associated institutions.
Given its complexity, one should
therefore not think of EUI as a
contribution to macroeconomic
management in the short term.
Beyond EUI, other stabilisation
tools such as European
investment plan financed by joint
borrowing would be more suited
to influence the area-wide fiscal
stance while being more quickly
operational, but they would also
come with difficulties15.
This Policy Brief was written at the
request of the Italian Presidency of
the EU and was presented at the
informal meeting of EU finance
ministers (ECOFIN) on 13 Septem-
ber 2014 and the informal meeting
of EU labour and social ministers
(EPSCO) on 18 July 2014. The
authors are grateful to colleague
inside and outside of Bruegel for
their comments, and to Simon
Ganem and Pia Hüttl for their excel-
lent research assistance.
problem of defining and imple-
menting an optimal aggregate
fiscal stance. National policymak-
ers would still be faced with the
challenge of coordinating their
fiscal policies. The scheme would,
however, increase fiscal space in
countries hit by a severe down-
turn. EUI can therefore be
considered a tool to address
country-specific shocks.
EUI cannot simply be analysed
from a fiscal point of view. We
have documented the substantial
heterogeneity in labour market
institutions in different EU coun-
tries and  we have also shown that
in many countries social partners
are involved in unemployment
insurance policies. An EUI
scheme would have major impli-
cations for labour market
institutions and social dialogue.
This is both a challenge and an
opportunity.
The introduction of EUI would be
an opportunity to fundamentally
reform European labour markets,
foster mobility and create a truly
single market. Converging on a
model of best practice would
increase efficiency and would
make the conduct of a single
monetary policy easier14. But it is
also clear that this is not only a
political and technical challenge
that will take years to implement.
There will also be justified resist-
ance to the harmonisation of
labour laws in a context in which
national legislation reflects both
historical developments and fun-
Jacques and Pierre-
Olivier Gourinchas
(2014) ‘The Blue
Labour Deal: An Incen-
tive-Compatible
Unemployment Insur-
ance in the Eurozone’,
CAE Presentation, avail-
able at
http://www.ceps.eu/files
/article/2014/08/Euro5
0March2014Delpla.pdf.
15. For investment pro-
posals, see Sapir, André
and Guntram B. Wolff
(2014) ‘Memo to the
presidents of the Euro-
pean Commission, the
European Council and
the European Parlia-
ment’, in André Sapir
(ed) EU to do in 2015-
2019: Memos to the
new EU leadership,
Bruegel; Darvas, Zsolt
and Guntram B. Wolff
(2014) ‘Memo to the
Commissioner for eco-
nomic and monetary
affairs’, in André Sapir
(ed) EU to do in 2015-
2019: Memos to the
new EU leadership,
Bruegel; and Szczurek,
Mateusz (2014)
‘Quantifying the macro-
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European fund for
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blog,
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nc/blog/detail/arti-
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